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RECENT DECISIONS
SECURITIES--LoCK-UP OPTIONS EMPLOYED BY TARGET COR-
PORATIONS AS A DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUE TO UNWANTED TAKE-
OVERS
Any corporation can become the object or "target" of an unso-
licited tender offer' for its shares. The tender offer often leads to the
target corporation's forced merger with the tender offeror.2 The pos-
sibility of an unwanted merger with the unsolicited tender offeror
may encourage the target corporation to resist the tender offer by
employing one or more defensive tactics designed to discourage the
tender offeror.3 For example, the target corporation may dissuade
the tender offeror by making itself a less attractive candidate for
merger or take-over.
4
One recently developed defensive tactic involves granting a
"lock-up option"5 to a friendly third party or "white knight."' To
discourage the unsolicited tender offeror and avoid a possible merger
with it, the target corporation might grant the white knight an op-
tion to purchase, thus inhibiting unwanted tender offerors. The lock-
I A publicly announced offer to all shareholders of a particular corporation, the target
corporation, by another corporation, the tender offeror, constitutes a tender offer. Cohn,
Tender OFers and the Sale of Control" An Analogue to Determine the Validi of Target Management
Defensive Measures, 66 IOWA L. REv. 475, 475 n.I (1981).
2 Id at 481.
3 Id at 476-77.
4 The variety of defensive tactics employed is limited only by target management's inge-
nuity and creativity. Defensive tactics that have been used include, but are not limited to:
repurchase of shares; open market purchases of the target's shares by friendly third parties;
dividend increases; stock splits; issuance of additional shares; creation of incompatibility be-
tween the target and the offeror; defensive mergers; discriminatory voting provisions; legal
actions; and restrictive loan agreements. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 219-76 (1973). See also Hayes & Tausig, Tactics of Takeover Bids, 45
HARV. Bus. REv. 135 (1967); Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender
Ofers, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 901 (1979); Schmultz & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defensive Tac-
tics, 72 Bus. LAw 115 (1967); Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 23 CASE
W. RES. 882 (1978); Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements In Contesting
Tender Ofers, 21 STANFORD L. REV. 1104 (1969). For a listing of pertinent articles see Com-
ment, A Review of the Literature on Defensive Tactics to Surprise Cash Tender Offers, 13 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 909 (1980).
5 Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 198 1), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1490 (1982). In Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the
court did not specifically use the term "lock-up;" however, the factual situation can be char-
acterized in this manner.
6 Cohn, supra note 1, at 489.
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up option granted the white knight in exchange for its tender offer
bid might be an option to purchase a number of the target's unissued
shares at a bargain price or an option to purchase the target's most
prized asset, or "crown jewel."' 7 The unsolicited tender offeror and
other parties operating without the benefit of the lock-up option
must then reassess their take-over plans. The target thus attempts to
discourage the unwanted tender offeror by giving a third party the
opportunity to substantially decrease the target's value. The options,
in effect, "lock up" the bidding for the target corporation.8
Two recent decisions, Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co. 9 and Mar-
shall Field & Co. v. Icahn,"1 have considered the legality of devices that
might be characterized as lock-up options. This note considers the
Mobil and Marshall Field decisions in the lock-up option context.
Part I addresses the Mobil case and analyzes the court's approach in
that decision. Part II addresses the Marshall Field case and its differ-
ing approach to the problem. Part III discusses the distinctions be-
tween Mobil and Marshall Field that may account for their variant
holdings. Part IV discusses the practical effect on corporate manage-
ment of the two decisions and concludes that, given the many poten-
tial scenarios and the few guidelines in this area, any lock-up option
may end up in litigation.
I. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co."
In Mobil, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit ruled that two lock-up options Marathon Oil Company had
granted U.S. Steel in exchange for a tender offer were unlawful.'
2
The Sixth Circuit held that the options constituted manipulative acts
or practices in connection with a tender offer, and therefore violated
section 14(e) of the Williams Act.' 3
7 669 F.2d at 367.
8 Id at 377. If the third-party white knight can acquire the target's most valuable asset
or purchase the target's shares at low prices, thus decreasing the target's value to a majority
shareholder, the unsolicited tender offeror may drop out of the bidding for the target's shares.
9 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), ceri. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).
10 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
11 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).
12 Id at 377.
13 Id The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Williams Act is designed to
protect shareholders of the target corporation. Piper v. Chris-Craft, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 39
(1977); Williams Act §§ 13(d), (e), (0, 14(d), (e), (0, 15 U.S.C. § 78 m, 78 n(d), (e), (1) (1976).
Section 14(e), the Act's general anti-fraud provision provides in pertinent part: "(e) It shall
be unlawful for any person. . . to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts
or practices, in connection with any tender offer .... "
[Vol. 58:926]
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A. Facts
On October 30, 1981, Mobil Corporation (Mobil) announced its
intent to purchase up to forty million Marathon shares (over one-half
of Marathon's outstanding shares) for $85 per share.' 4 This tender
offer announcement accompanied Mobil's announcement of its in-
tent to merge with Marathon.' 5 Marathon's directors evidently con-
sidered Mobil an unattractive merger candidate and, in response to
Mobil's announcements, sought a white knight corporation with
which to merge.
6
Marathon's search for a white knight ended on November 18,
1981, when its directors voted to recommend that its shareholders
accept a U.S. Steel offer of $125 per share for thirty million, or over
one-half, of Marathon's outstanding shares.' 7 The U.S. Steel tender
offer was part of a plan under which its subsidiary, U.S.S. Corpora-
tion (USS), would merge with Marathon if the tender offer
succeeded. "8
Marathon secured the USS tender offer with two options.' 9
They were: (1) an option by which USS could have purchased ten
million authorized but unissued shares of Marathon common stock
at $90 per share (stock option); and (2) an option by which USS
could have elected to purchase Marathon's 48% interest in an oil-
producing property, Yates Field, for $2.8 billion (Yates Field op-
tion).20 Marathon considered Yates Field its "crown jewel," or most
valuable asset.2 '
Mobil reacted to the Marathon-USS agreement by seeking a
14 669 F.2d at 367. Mobil, the nation's second largest oil company, sought to acquire
Marathon, the nation's seventeenth largest oil company, in keeping with a "long-standing
Mobil policy of acquiring and developing oil and gas assets." N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1981, at I,
col. 4.
15 669 F.2d at 367. Mobil intended to follow the share purchase pursuant to the tender
offer with an acquisition of the balance of Marathon by merger. Id
16 Id In response to Mobil's tender offer, Marathon also sued to enjoin Mobil's proposed
acquisition as a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp.,
530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio 1981). The district court granted Marathon's request for a
preliminary injunction upon a showing that Mobil's proposed acquisition would substantially
lessen competition in the relevant market in violation of the antitrust laws. The Sixth Circuit
later affirmed that district court order. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).





21 Id Yates Field is one of the world's most prolific oil fields, and is expected to produce
oil for 90 more years. Both Allied Industries and Gulf Oil had conditioned their proposed
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temporary restraining order to block any USS purchase of Marathon
shares pursuant to that agreement.2 2 Mobil principally claimed that
the two options, taken together, constituted a "lock-up" designed to
defeat competitive bidding for Marathon shares. Thus, Mobil ar-
gued, the options served as "manipulative" practices in connection
with a tender offer and therefore violated the Williams Act.23 The
District Court granted Mobil's request for a temporary restraining
order in part,, forbidding any action concerning either the USS
tender offer or the Yates Field option.
2 4
On November 25, 1982, Mobil announced a new tender offer,
proposing to purchase thirty million shares of Marathon's outstand-
ing stock at $126 per share (outbidding USS by $1 per share). Mobil
conditioned its offer on the judicial removal of the options granted
USS.25
On December 7, 1981, the district court denied Mobil's applica-
tion for a preliminary injunction against the Marathon-USS op-
tions.26 The court found Mobil had not demonstrated a "substantial
likelihood of success on the merits" of its claim that the options con-
stituted manipulative acts in violation of section 14(e) of the Wil-
liams Act.
2 7
On December 23, 1981, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the options
constituted manipulative acts in connection with a tender offer and
therefore violated section 14(e) of the Williams Act.2 8 The court
offers for Marathon on receiving options to acquire the Yates Field interest. This is further
evidence of Yates Field's importance to tender offerors. Id
22 Id at 368.
23 Id See Williams Act § 14(e),supra at note 13. Mobil also claimed that Marathon had
failed to disclose material information concerning this option package to its shareholders, also
a § 14(e) violation. Finally, Mobil claimed that Marathon had violated various state law
provisions. 669 F.2d at 367.
24 Id at 368.
25 669 F.2d at 369.
26 Id
27 Id at 370. The district court applied the test for granting a preliminary injunction
noted in Mason County Medical Ass'n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1977). 669 F.2d at
369. Mason County set forth a four-prong test:
1. Whether the plaintiff has shown a strong or substantial likelihood or probability
of success on the merits;
2. Whether the plaintiff has shown irreparable injury;
3. Whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm
to others;
4. Whether the public interest would be served by issuing the preliminary
injunction.
563 F.2d at 261.
28 669 F.2d at 377.
[Vol. 58:926]
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thereby reversed the district court and ordered that the USS offer be
kept open, without the options, for a time to be determined by the
lower court.29 During this time, Marathon shareholders were to be
notified and allowed to withdraw any tenders already made.30 The
Sixth Circuit also ordered that Marathon be allowed to accept any
tender offers from others no longer inhibited by the "coercive impact
of the two options."'3'
B. Court's Reasoning
After finding that Mobil had standing to seek injunctive relief
under the Williams Act,3 2 the Sixth Circuit addressed the question
whether the options constituted manipulative acts or practices in vio-
lation of section 14(e).33  The court concluded that Mobil had
demonstrated a "substantial likelihood of ultimately establishing" its
claim that using the options had violated the Williams Act.
34
In doing so, the Sixth Circuit adopted the United States
Supreme Court's definition of "manipulative" as applied in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder.35 "Manipulation," said the Sixth Circuit, is an
"affecting of the market for, or price of, securities by artificial means,
i.e., means unrelated to the natural forces of supply and demand. '36
In the Sixth Circuit's view, Mobil had shown a substantial likelihood
of ultimately establishing that the Yates Field option and the stock
option affected Marathon's stock price by artificial means unrelated
to the natural forces of supply and demand.
37
Taken separately and together, the two options were manipula-
tive because they circumvented natural market forces by, in effect,
29 Id
30 Id
31 Id at 378.
32 Id at 372. The United States Supreme Court had addressed the issue of standing
under the Williams Act in Piper v. Chris-Craft, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The Supreme Court
held that a tender offeror such as Mobil could not assert a private claim for damages against
the target corporation. Nevertheless, the Court in Piper expressly left open the question of
whether a tender offeror such as Mobil could seek injunctive relief under the Williams Act.
430 U.S. at 47 & n.33. The Sixth Circuit answered this open question affirmatively in Mobil,
concluding that the tender offeror had standing. 669 F.2d at 372.
33 669 F.2d at 373.
34 Id at 375.
35 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Manipulative "connotes intentional or willful conduct designed
to deceive or defraud investors by artificially affecting the price of securities." Id at 199.
Ernst &Ernst concerned an action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id
36 669 F.2d at 374. The Sixth Circuit noted that it knew of no Supreme Court or Court
of Appeals case addressing the question of whether options such as the ones granted USS were
"manipulative" within the meaning of § 14(e) of the Williams Act. Id
37 669 F.2d at 375.
[April 19831
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not permitting the market to determine the fair price for Marathon
shares.38 First, the Yates Field option purported to give USS the op-
portunity to acquire Marathon's most valuable asset for $2.8 billion
if another bidder had successfully taken over Marathon.3 9 The dis-
trict court found $2.8 billion to have been a fair price for Yates Field.
However, the Sixth Circuit commented that, absent the option, Mo-
bil and others might have reasonably valued Yates Field at a higher
price and have been willing to reflect that higher valuation in their
tender offers. 40 Because anyone outbidding USS for control of Mara-
thon risked losing Marathon's most valuable asset, the option de-
terred Mobil and others from bidding competitively against USS for
control of Marathon.
4 1
Second, Marathon purported to grant USS a stock option, pur-
suant to which USS could purchase ten million authorized but unis-
sued Marathon shares for $90 per share.4 2 The Sixth Circuit, citing
Marathon's own investment banker's estimates, noted that this large
stock option (concerning ten million shares), coupled with the USS
bid ($125 per share for thirty million Marathon shares), forced Mobil
and any other tender offerors seeking forty million shares to bid an
additional $1.1 to 1.2 billion to match the USS offer.43 Thus, the
stock option, as well as the Yates Field option, discouraged others
from competing with USS for control of Marathon." The Sixth Cir-
cuit ruled that the stock option, like the Yates Field option, placed an
artificial $125 per share ceiling on the amount that Marathon share-
holders could receive for their stock.45 Mobil eventually outbid USS,
but only upon the condition that both options were removed.46
Having concluded that both options violated section 14(e) of the
Williams Act, the Sixth Circuit enjoined the use of the illegal op-
tions.47 The court also insisted that the USS tender offer be kept
open for a reasonable time, but without the unlawful options. Judge
38 Id at 376. See note 35 supra.





44 Id at 376.
45 Id Mobil also had claimed that Marathon breached its fiduciary duty under Ohio
Rev. Code § 1701.76. 669 F.2d at 368. The Sixth Circuit deemed unnecessary a considera-
tion of any state law claim. Since it granted the preliminary injunction based on the Wil-
liams Act, no other basis for the injunction was necessary. Id at 369 n.3.
46 Id at 376.
47 Id at 377.
[Vol. 58:926]
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Engel reasoned that if USS immediately withdrew its offer, it would
benefit unjustifiably, because others were unlawfully dissuaded from
competing with it for Marathon tenders.48 In ordering that the USS
$125 per share offer be kept open, the court sought to give Marathon
shareholders time to consider offers from others, "uninhibited by the
coercive impact of the two options," and the opportunity to with-
draw tenders already made.49 The Sixth Circuit presumably wanted
the lower court to grant enough time for the stock price to reach its
true market price.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit noted that their decision did not de-
fine all forms of options or lock-up devices as manipulative under the
Williams Act. The court stated, "[we] leave these issues to develop-
ing law in this new and difficult area of securities regulation.
50
II. Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn
51
In Marshall Field, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York denied a request for a temporary re-
straining order filed by an investment group that Icahn headed
(Icahn Group or Icahn).52 The Icahn group held approximately 30%
of Marshall Field and Company's (Marshall Field or Field) stock.
53
The group sought to prevent Marshall Field and BATUS, Inc.
(BATUS) from furthering BATUS's tender offer for Marshall Field's
stock as long as certain BATUS-Field agreements remained effec-
tive.54 Icahn failed to convince the court that the agreements were
among the "manipulative acts" that section 14(e) of the Williams Act
proscribes. 55
The controversy in Marshall Field developed gradually. Over a
four month period, Icahn acquired a large percentage of Field
stock,56 apparently in attempt to gain control. Evidence indicated
that Icahn sought to control Marshall Field because Icahn believed
certain Field properties would be worth more if liquidated than if
48 Id
49 Id at 377-78.
50 Id at 377.
51 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
52 Id at 420. The court found that Icahn had shown neither "irreparable harm, nor
likelihood of success on the merits, nor a balance of hardships tipping in its favor." Id
53 Id at 418.
54 Id at 420.
55 Id at 422.
56 Id at 417. The Icahn group's involvement in the case began in the winter of 1981-82,




retained as part of a going concern.57
Marshall Field disapproved of Icahn's seeming attempt to gain
control and made several attempts to thwart it. Field not only
sought judicial help,58 but while Icahn continued to buy stock, Field
sought competing tender offers from possible white knights. On
March 17, 1982, BATUS announced its tender offer for Field stock;
Field had found its white knight.59
57 Id at 415. The evidence to which District Judge Leval referred included a study pre-
pared for Mr. Icahn that concluded that Field assets had been undervalued. Judge Leval also
referred to "sketchy evidence" indicating that Icahn had tentatively planned to invest cash
raised by selling the assets of undervalued companies. Thus, Judge Leval evidently con-
cluded that Marshall Field was among those undervalued companies that Icahn had in-
tended to acquire and sell at a profit. In his opinion, Judge Leval suggested that the Icahn
group had planned to acquire Marshall Field, cause Marshall to sell its undervalued real
estate properties at a profit, and invest the cash. Id
58 On February 16, 1982, the district court granted a temporary restraining order
preventing the Icahn group's further acquisition of Marshall Field stock (the group had ac-
quired 8.7% of Field's stock under an inadequate Schedule 13D statement) until a proper 13D
statement was filed. Id at 416. Schedule 13D, Item 4 of the Securities Exchange Commission
Regulations, promulgated pursuant to § 13(d)(i) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, re-
quires potential acquirers to state the purpose of their acquisitions. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1
(1982). Judge Leval noted that Schedule 13D reporters (like the Icahn group) must indicate
in their filings whether they intend to follow an acquisition with "extraordinary corporate
transactions, material sales of assets and material changes" in the issuer's business. 357 F.
Supp. at 415-16. Judge Leval concluded that Icahn had tentatively intended such action and
was therefore required to reveal its intent in its Schedule 13D filing. The court found that the
statement Icahn had filed under Schedule 13D of the Securities Exchange Commission regu-
lations was defective because it had failed to adequately state Icahn's intention concerning its
acquisition and disposition of Field assets. On February 19, 1982, Icahn amended its 13D
statement to properly disclose its intent regarding the Field assets; the district court then lifted
the temporary restraining order. Id at 417. Icahn continued to acquire Field stock until it
owned 23% of Field; Field then sought another temporary restraining order against further
Icahn stock purchases. The district court denied Field's second request, ruling that the
amended 13D statement adequately disclosed Icahn's intentions. While it refused to block
Icahn's continued stock acquisitions, the court left open the possibility of other relief for Field.
Specifically, the court noted that it could, if appropriate, bar the Icahn group from voting the
8.7% of Field stock it had acquired while the initial, allegedly misleading 13D statement was
filed, or it could grant misinformed Field stock sellers rescission or damages. Nevertheless, the
court denied Field's request for the temporary restraining order, and the Icahn group contin-
ued to acquire Field stock through its tender offer. Id
59 537 F. Supp. at 418. During this search, Field again moved for a preliminary injunc-
tion to enjoin Icahn from acquiring more Field stock and to prevent Icahn from voting the
shares acquired while Icahn had operated under its initial, deficient 13D statement. Id at
417. The district court denied the preliminary injunction request on March 23, 1982. Id at
420. Once again, Field contended that Icahn's 13D filings had misrepresented its intent, and,
once again, the court ruled that the statements had been adequate. Id at 417. In the alterna-
tive, Field sought to enjoin Icahn from voting the 8.7% of Field's stock that Icahn had ac-
quired under the inadequate filing. Field argued that, absent an injunction, Icahn would
benefit from having violated the securities laws. The court admitted that Icahn had offered a
strong argument, but denied the injunction request. Id at 418. Judge Leval first reasoned
that the original 13D statement's falsity had been determined only tentatively, justifying the
[Vol. 58:9261
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In response, Icahn asked the court to issue a temporary re-
straining order against Marshall Field and BATUS to prevent
BATUS from acquiring Field stock via its tender offer.tio The Icahn
group, which now held 30% of Marshall Field's stock, objected to
several agreements between BATUS and Marshall Field that Icahn
contended gave BATUS a competitive advantage over other bidders
for Field. Icahn contended that the agreements were manipulative
and thus violated section 14(e) of the Williams Act. Icahn argued
that the agreements had discouraged others from competing with
BATUS to control Field.6' On March 26, 1982, the district court
denied the temporary restraining order and concluded that the harm
Icahn sought to prevent was purely speculative.62 The court distin-
guished the Mobil case and expressed doubts as to Mobil's validity in
the Second Circuit.63 Judge Leval noted that Mobil could prevent
management from combating a takeover attempt that it in good
faith believed to be harmful to its shareholders.64 He further noted
that the rule might be different if management acted only in its own
interests, breaching its fiduciary duties owed to shareholders.
65
The first agreement to which Icahn objected committed
BATUS to purchase, and Field to sell, two million shares of Field
treasury stock at $25.50 per share (treasury stock agreement). 66 The
$25.50 price per share matched BATUS's original March 17 tender
price, which BATUS increased to $30 per share the next day.
637
Under the treasury stock agreement, Field was to relieve BATUS of
temporary restraining order and no more. Id at 419. Second, an action denying Icahn the
power to vote the stock would not have benefitted the Field stock sellers whom the incorrect
filing misinformed. Id Third, no shareholder vote was scheduled for eight months; thus, the
preliminary injunction application was premature. Icahn may not have even owned the dis-
puted stock after eight months. Id
Field also contended that certain Icahn group members had failed to file the required
13D statement. The court ruled that, even if such a failure to file had violated the law, the
filed statement clearly outlined those members' roles in the acquisition. Thus no one was
misled. Id at 420.
Finally, Field claimed that Icahn had violated the anti-racketeering statute, the RICO
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976). The court found no likelihood that Field would have
been successful on the merits of the claim and denied the preliminary injunction request. 537
F. Supp. at 420.
60 537 F. Supp. at 420.
61 Id








its stock purchase commitment if BATUS or any third party ob-
tained 51% of Field stock, or if BATUS kept its tender offer open
until April 1, 1983.18 Icahn primarily objected to the treasury stock
agreement because of the possibility of BATUS using the stock to
purchase Field properties131
The second objection was to an agreement that gave BATUS
the opportunity to buy Marshall Field's Chicago Division properties,
should Field have offered them for sale within one year after the
BATUS-Field merger agreement had terminated (right of first re-
fusal agreement). 70 Thus, had Field offered its prized Chicago Divi-
sion properties for sale within one year after any termination of the
merger agreement with BATUS, BATUS could have denied any
other party the opportunity to purchase the properties by purchasing
them itself. The agreement permitted BATUS to pay for the Chi-
cago Division properties with Field stock valued at BATUS's cost. 7 1
At a conference before Icahn's application for the temporary re-
straining order, Judge Leval had expressed concern that this right of
first refusal might prevent competitive bidding for the Chicago Divi-
sion properties. 72 In response, BATUS and Field modified the agree-
ment to provide that, if BATUS exercised its right of first refusal,
Field would reopen the bidding for the Chicago properties. 7-3 Despite
the modification, Icahn contended that, by using Field stock valued
at BATUS's cost, BATUS could purchase the properties at a bargain
price should. Field stock drop in value. 74 Judge Leval countered by
68 Id Thus, BATUS would have had to execute the agreement only if it needed the stock
to gain control and was excused if a third party gained control. Also, BATUS would be
excused from the agreement if it kept its tender offer open until April 1, 1983 (about one
year). Id By then, Marshall Field would have presumably been safe from Icahn's "threat" to
purchase and cause liquidation of Marshall Field assets. See note 57 supra.
69 Id at 421.
70 Id
71 Id One could speculate that Field had intended this right of first refusal agreement to
dissuade Icahn from acquiring control of Marshall Field. Such an agreement might thereby
prevent Icahn from quickly liquidating the business and selling Field's undervalued assets,
such as its "crown jewel" Chicago Division properties, at a substantial profit. The right of
first refusal would have put Icahn, or any other potential controlling shareholder of Field to a
choice: (1) the controlling shareholder could wait one year before selling the Chicago Division
properties; or (2) it could sell them sooner and risk a sale to BATUS for stock valued at
BATUS's cost. Icahn's suit demonstrates that such a sale to BATUS may not have yielded
the quick liquidation profit that Icahn desired.
72 Id
73 Id With this modification the court believed that no one could contend that exercis-
ing the right of first refusal could cause a sale below market price because bidding would have
been open even if BATUS had exercised the option. Id
74 Id To illustrate, suppose that BATUS's cost for Field stock was $10 per share, and
[Vol. 58:9261
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noting that the only stock BATUS conceivably would use would be
the treasury stock which it had purchased at a premium price, not a
bargain price.
75
Judge Leval further noted that the possibility of BATUS exer-
cising its right of first refusal was remote.7" The right of first refusal
would have arisen only if Field had announced a sale of its Chicago
Division properties within one year after the BATUS-Field merger
agreement ended. By simply waiting one year, Field's new manage-
ment could have denied BATUS its right of first refusal under the
second agreement.
77
Icahn's third group of objections concerned two Field agree-
ments (bidding process agreements), one with prospective "white
knights" during the period Field "shopped" its company, 78 and that
part of the BATUS-Field merger agreement in which Field agreed
not to solicit competing bids for Field stock.79 First, Marshall Field
had provided confidential information to prospective white knights
for those white knights to use to formulate bids.80 In return, each
prospective white knight agreed with Field, before the BATUS-Field
merger agreement, that none would purchase Field shares without
prior Field board-of-directors approval.8 ' Judge Leval noted that
this agreement for board approval was "well justified," considering
the possibility of purchases based upon inside information (a refer-
ence to potential securities laws violations).82
This agreement required potential white knights to get Field
that the price later dropped to $5 per share. If BATUS used Field stock valued at $10
(BATUS's cost) to purchase the Chicago Division properties, a stock price dip to $5 would
indeed yield a bargain purchase. Judge Leval rebutted this conclusion by noting that, since
BATUS owned no Field stock, it would have had to use treasury shares purchased at $25.50
per share under the first agreement. Id $25.50 per share was a premium price (above the
market price). Thus, had BATUS exercised its rights under the second agreement and
purchased the Chicago properties, it would have paid with Field stock for which it had al-
ready paid a premium price. Since Field would have previously received $25.50 per share,
the court reasoned that accepting these shares sold at that premium price would not have
hurt Field. Id
75 Id. at 421.
76 Id
77 Id
78 Id While searching for its white knight to avoid the Icahn takeover, Field "shopped"




82 Id Securities laws prohibit certain persons from trading certain stocks based on inside
information. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b), 16(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 780)(b)
and 78 (p) (1976).
[April 1983]
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board approval for bids.83 At oral argument, Judge Leval ques-
tioned the propriety of requiring potential bidders to gain Field
board approval before purchasing any Field stock.84 Judge Leval im-
plied that, since BATUS's March 17 tender offer had publicized the
previously confidential information, restricting the other bidders
froze competition without sufficient reason.8 5 After Judge Leval's in-
quiry, Field waived its right of approval for offerors seeking to
purchase 51% or more of the Field stock.
86
Icahn contended that, even as modified, the white knight bid-
ding process agreement improperly interfered with the market. As a
Field shareholder, Icahn contended that Field's agreement not to so-
licit any bids, and its denying some potential bidders an opportunity
to make offers for less than 51% of the Field stock, deprived Icahn of
competitive bidding for Field's stock.87 Judge Leval found that these
bidding process restrictions were proper and served the best interests
of Field's shareholders. Judge Leval reasoned that, even though
Icahn might offer a better price per share than BATUS, Icahn need
only purchase about 20% of Field's outstanding shares to gain control
of Field, because Icahn already controlled 30%.88 On the other hand,
BATUS had bid for over 50% of Field stock and had committed it-
self, under the stock agreement, to purchase more Field shares at a
premium price (under the treasury stock agreement). Under the
BATUS package, many more Field shares would be sold; therefore,
more Field shareholders stood to benefit.
8 9
Icahn contended that the bidding process agreements thwarted
potential bidders. Judge Leval commented that no indication ex-
isted that any potential competing bidder had been thwarted.90 In
fact, Field had notified each so-called potential bidder, prior to
83 537 F. Supp. at 421.
84 Id
85 Because BATUS's public tender offer for Field stock had publicized the previously
confidential information, the justification for the board approval requirement (preventing
trading based on inside information) was no longer valid. Id
86 Id at 421.
87 Id at 421-22. Icahn's claimed injury as a Field stockholder makes some sense. The
bidding process agreements removed Marshall Field from the open market in the sense that
potential bidders could not bid without approval. This requirement injured all Field share-
holders, contended Icahn, by restricting the bidding market at the whim of Field's board.
Judge Leval considered this argument "purely theoretical" since Icahn had offered no evi-
dence that Field's board had denied anyone permission to buy Field stock. The court would
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BATUS's March 17 bid, that the time to bid was at hand.91 None
had approached Field to ask either for approval to bid or to be re-
lieved of the approval requirement) 2 The court stated that Icahn's
purely speculative assertions of harm did not warrant a temporary
restraining order. :
Judge Leval noted that Mobil could be distinguished from Mar-
shall Field even if Mobil had been a Second Circuit decision. The
agreements in Marshall Field were not options, such as the stock op-
tion or Yates Field option in Mobil.94 Further, the options in Mobil
created an artificial price ceiling in the tender offer market, '15 while
the Marshall Field agreements did not.9(i Significantly, Judge Leval
questioned the Mobil decision and contended that it could interfere
with management's ability to combat a take-over attempt viewed as
harmful to the target's shareholders.
') 7
III. Comparison of Mobil and Marshall Field
At first blush, the district court's decision to deny a temporary
restraining order in Marshall Field conflicts with the Sixth Circuit's
decision to grant a preliminary injunction in Mobil. However, a
closer comparison reveals that the contractual arrangements in-
volved were actually quite different and that the holdings are not
inconsistent.
First, the stock options at issue should be examined. In Mobil,
the stock option Marathon gave to USS was critical to the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision to issue an injunction.9 The court said the $90 per
share option on ten million shares effectively prevented other bidders
from "competing on a par with USS," thus giving USS a competitive
advantage and discouraging competitive bidding.!) The stock option
was therefore manipulative. 00 By contrast, the district court in Mar-
shall Field apparently did not consider the stock sale agreement for
two million treasury shares at $25.50 per share to be significant, ex-




95 669 F.2d at 375.
96 537 F. Supp. at 421-22.
97 Id
98 See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
99 669 F.2d at 376.
100 Id. at 377. Potential competitors for control of Marathon would be forced to offer
$125 per share for each share of Marathon while USS could purchase its first ten million
shares for only $90 per share. The court found this difference to be manipulative. Id at 376.
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cept as it applied to the sale of the Chicago Division properties."'
The opinion mentioned neither the market price of Marshall Field
shares at the time of the agreement nor the price Icahn offered share-
holders for their stock. However, the court noted that the sale was
"at a premium."'' 0 2 Therefore, the $25.50 price may have been above
the market price, not $35 below the tender offer price, as in Mobil. 1:
Consequently, the stock deal in Mobil gave USS an unfair advantage
over other tender offerors, while in Marshall Field, BATUS was given
no corresponding advantage by the stock deal.
Next, the Yates Field option Marathon granted USS differed
significantly from the right of first refusal Marshall Field granted
BATUS on the Chicago Division properties. The option Marathon
granted USS was exercisable by USS only if a third party gained
control of Marathon. This option was designed to rob Marathon of
its most valuable asset.'0 4 Such an option represents a more powerful
deterrent to potential tender offerors than a right of first refusal.
Judge Leval pointed out that BATUS's right of first refusal would be
significant only if Field management had decided to sell the Chicago
properties within a year after the Field-BATUS merger had termi-
nated. 0 5 Field's management could have effectively eliminated
BATUS's ability to acquire the Chicago Division properties simply
by not offering them for sale. Significantly, this restriction would
have deterred only a potential offeror who was interested in immedi-
ately selling the Chicago properties. Evidence indicated that this
might have been Icahn's motive.'0 6 If so, the deterrence was directed
only at the Icahn group and other liquidation-minded tender offer-
ors. Also, the option Marathon granted USS contained no time limi-
tation. 0 7 BATUS's right of first refusal, on the other hand, was
limited to one year; this was another mitigating factor. 08 As Judge
Leval pointed out, any new management could simply wait one year
to defeat BATUS's right of first refusal.' 0 9 When thus compared, the
Yates Field option much more readily fits the label of "manipula-
tive" than the right of first refusal granted BATUS.
101 See notes 76-83 supra and accompanying text.
102 537 F. Supp. at 421.
103 See note 75 supra.
104 See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
105 See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
106 See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
107 669 F.2d at 367-68.
108 See notes 78-82 supra and accompanying text.
109 537 F. Supp. at 421.
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Judge Leval also gave significance to two BATUS-Field agree-
ment modifications he had instigated. The first allowed Field to reo-
pen the bidding for the Chicago Division properties if BATUS
exercised its right of first refusal. 10 The parties made this modifica-
tion when Judge Leval expressed concern that the right of first re-
fusal would prevent competitive bidding for the Chicago
properties."'1 This agreement gave BATUS the right of first refusal
at the highest bid price, but prevented a sale of the properties below
a fair market price.1 2 No similar provision allowed the market to
determine the price of the Yates Field in the option Marathon
granted USS.113
Judge Leval also instigated a second modification-Field's
waiver of its right to approve competing tender offers it received
from previously solicited white knights.' 1 4
Judge Leval's involvement in shaping the Marshall Field agree-
ment emphasizes the difference in the procedural stages of the two
cases. A district court judge, such as Judge Leval, may suggest cer-
tain modifications to correct the situation from which relief is sought.
Therefore, he will be more likely to deny relief where he can and does
correct the situation by modifying the agreement.
Further, the plaintiff must meet a far less stringent standard for
a temporary restraining order than for a preliminary injunction." 5
The Sixth Circuit's grant of a preliminary injunction and the Mar-
shall Field district court's refusal to issue a temporary restraining or-
der indicate the significance of the circumstances in each case.
IV. Conclusion
When faced with an unsolicited tender offer, target manage-
ment can find itself in a difficult position if it deems the possible
results of a successful tender offer undesirable. Any defensive tactic
employed by target management is likely to be strictly scrutinized
under the Williams Act. However, the Williams Act does not per se
110 See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
111 Id
112 See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
113 669 F.2d at 375.
114 537 F. Supp. at 421. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
115 See note 27 supra for preliminary injunction standards. By contrast, Rule 65(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a temporary restraining order upon a "clear" show-
ing "that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, and damage will result to the applicant
before the adverse party, or his attorney can be heard in opposition, and. . . the applicant's
attorney certifies to the court.. . the reasons. . . that notice should not be required." FED.
R. Civ. P. 65(b).
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forbid target management defensive tactics, but only forbids those
that are "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."' Il As the holdings
in Mobil and Marshall Field illustrate, the distinction between what is
manipulative and what is not can be slight.
Target management should not be completely hamstrung in its
response to an undesirable tender offer. Management's position im-
poses upon it a fiduciary responsibility to the corporation and stock-
holders;" 7 this duty could require a defensive response to an
undesirable tender offer. Conversely, a nonmanipulative defensive
tactic could still be attacked as a breach of management's fiduciary
duty under state law if the response was unjustified.I"8 The options
granted USS by Marathon were certainly manipulative. The district
court's refusal to brand the Marshall Field arrangements as manipula-
tive allows target management some leeway to respond to an undesir-
able tender offer.
The Marshall Field and Mobil decisions reflect neither different
policies nor different standards. Rather, the decisions simply reflect a
difference in the factual arrangements presented to the courts. Any
arrangement between a tender offer target company and a "white
knight" that resembles a "lock-up" will probably end up in litiga-
tion. Given the infinite number of possible variations and the pau-
city of definitive law in the "lock-up" area, the outcome of any case




116 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
117 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, Dirctors,
Other Ojiters AndAgents § 838 (Rev. Ed. 1975).
118 "Like agents in general, a director or other corporate officer must be loyal to his trust,
use ordinary and reasonable care. . . act in good faith. . . and is generally liable for negli-
gence. . . ." Id § 990.
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